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ABSTRACT
This paper employs a game-theoretic framework and a comparative historical analysis to study the
impact of the Great Depression on "corporate welfarism," i.e., employers' voluntary provisions of
non-wage benefits, greater employment security, and employee representation to their blue-collar
workers. By characterizing corporate welfarism as an implicit contract equilibrium, the paper
documents parallel institutional developments in the U.S. and Japan towards corporate welfarism
during the 1920s and identifies the early 1930s as a bifurcation point at which the two trajectories
began to diverge toward two distinctive equilibria. In the U.S., the repudiation of the implicit
contracts by most leading firms induced by a deep depression caused a change in the expectations
of workers and the public, which, in turn, supported a legal reform and the adoption of explicit
employment contracts based on industrial unions and third-party enforcement. Experiencing a less
severe depression, most major employers in Japan maintained their implicit contracts, while
developing institutional arrangements to mitigate the cost of long-term commitment. In contrast to
the U.S., labor laws in Japan developed complementary to private welfare practices, endorsing








The rise of private welfare capitalism – employers’ voluntary provision of non-wage beneﬁts,
greater employment security, and employee representation to their blue-collar workers – in the
U.S. during the 1920s and its downfall in the 1930s have been a central subject of a number of
historical studies.1 Yet, there is a continuing debate over its importance and implications for the
subsequent development of American industrial relations. Some historians have argued that the
primary motive of private welfare capitalism was to enhance employers’ welfare at the expense of
workers’ welfare. According to this view, the employers introduced company housing, corporate
pension, and company unions to divide workers by ﬁrm and forestall trade unions to minimize
labor’s bargaining power. Brandes (1970) highlights the lack of employees’ appreciation of
corporate welfare, concluding that an “inequitable distribution of wealth and prerogative” under
private welfare capitalism could not have been maintained indeﬁnitely (p.146). The replacement
of corporate welfarism by the welfare state and industrial unionism was inevitable, and thus, the
Great Depression was certainly suﬃcient but far from necessary for welfare capitalism’s decline,
argues Bernstein (1960).
Other historians have claimed that the primary goal of private welfare capitalism was to
achieve greater eﬃciency that would improve employees’ welfare. According to this view, em-
ployers preferred company-level employee representation to trade unions because the former
could facilitate employer-employee cooperation while the latter were “outsiders” with little un-
derstanding of ﬁrms’ internal operation. Emphasizing the breadth and depth of corporate welfare
programs in the 1920s, Brody (1980) contends that corporate welfarism might have prevailed had
the Great Depression not hit the economy as strongly as it did (Chapter 2). In a similar spirit,
Piore & Sabel (1984) claim that the American industrial relations system that had emerged un-
der the New Deal was neither necessary nor uniquely eﬃcient, but rather a “historical accident”
(p.113). As the depression challenged even the most resourceful and committed employers, the
widespread failure to meet their promises led to disillusionment among their workers, observes
Cohen (1990).
Was American private welfare capitalism a form of managerial domination destined to fail,
1E.g., Bernstein (1960), Brandes (1970), Brody (1980), Berkowitz & McQaid (1980), Jacoby (1985), Zahavi
(1988), Cohen (1990), Fairris (1997), Tone (1997).
3or was it a Pareto improving initiative that ended prematurely due to an extraordinary economic
shock? The objective of this paper is to shed new light on the debate by introducing a game-
theoretic analysis and a comparative perspective. First, using a methodology pioneered by Greif
(1993), I apply insights from contract theory to examine the economic institution of private
welfare capitalism. Based on historical observations, I redeﬁne corporate welfarism as a set of
personnel policies that could constitute an implicit contract equilibrium in repeated employer-
employee interactions. The game-theoretic framework not only enables us, for the ﬁrst time,
to study the contractual nature of private welfare capitalism, but it also provides boundary
conditions for its existence and eﬃciency, indicates potential complementarity among a diverse
set of practices, and captures the role of expectations in an equilibrium selection as well as the
importance of history in shaping expectations.
Second, I employ a comparative historical analysis, using Japan’s experience in the 1930s
as counterfactual evidence to that of the U.S.2 Private welfare capitalism was not uniquely an
American phenomenon: most notably it was also seen in Britain, France, Germany, and Japan.
But as noted by Jacoby (1993), among these countries, the U.S. and Japan shared more in
common as the rise of corporate welfarism preceded the rise of welfare state and mass unionism
in both countries. Japanese employers’ conscious learning from contemporary U.S. practices also
contributed to the similarity of corporate welfarism across the two countries. The diﬀerential
magnitude of the Great Depression experienced by the two thus provides a natural experiment
– albeit not ideal – for evaluating the impact of the economic shock on corporate welfarism and
subsequent institutional developments. This is not to say that the employment systems in the
U.S. and Japan were identical prior to 1929: it is to claim that employment practices pertaining
to blue-collar workers in comparable sectors in the two economies were developing in parallel,
converging to an implicit contract equilibrium in the 1920s.
The historical analysis identiﬁes the early 1930s as a bifurcation point at which the institu-
tional trajectories in the U.S. and Japan began to diverge toward two distinct equilibria. In the
U.S., despite their initial eﬀort, the deep and prolonged depression induced a majority of welfare
capitalist ﬁrms to renege on their corporate welfare practices pertaining to blue-collar workers.
The repudiation of the implicit contract caused the change in expectations of both employees and
2See Ch¯ uma (1987) for an original insight.
4the public, which in turn supported the rise of union movements, adversarial labor-management
relations, and the development of explicit and legally-enforceable employment contracts in place
of implicit contracts. The initial unraveling of implicit contracts was reinforced by government
legislation that changed “the rules of the game” for private players. I argue that the nature
of the change was endogenous, reﬂecting the shift in the relative power of constituencies and
the dominant beliefs in the society. By contrast, during a shorter and less severe depression, a
majority of the proponents of corporate welfarism in Japan adhered to their implicit contracts,
while developing institutional arrangements that would mitigate further negative impacts of
business ﬂuctuations. As the perception of employees and the public remained relatively ap-
preciative of private welfare capitalism in Japan, the government intervention prompted by the
depression resulted in labor legislations that endorsed corporate welfare provision and employee
representation plans.
By the early 1940s, corporate welfarism in the U.S. and Japan began to take diﬀerent con-
tractual forms and enforcement mechanisms, foreshadowing distinct postwar industrial relations
systems in the respective countries (Moriguchi (2000)). In the U.S., although corporate welfare
programs pertaining to blue-collar employees were revived with the advent of WWII, discre-
tionary beneﬁt plans and company unionism were replaced by explicit contractual rights and
industrial unionism. In Japan, although workers obtained greater bargaining power and legal
rights immediately after the war, implicit and discretionary contracts and enterprise-wide unions
continued to shape labor-management relations in major industrial concerns. The analysis thus
indicates a path dependence in which the depression left a lasting impact on the subsequent
institutional development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the economics of private
welfare capitalism and introduces a theoretical framework. Section 3 establishes the compara-
bility of the nature and prevalence of corporate welfarism between the U.S. and Japan in the
1920s. Section 4 documents the impact of the Great Depression, and Section 5 contrasts the
endogenous transformation of labor laws in the two countries. To conclude, Section 6 discusses
counterfactuals implied by a comparative analysis.
52 Economics of Corporate Welfarism
2.1 Historical Background and Three Economic Rationales
Historians have documented employers’ voluntary provision of non-wage beneﬁts and services to
factory workers in the U.S. since the early twentieth century (Bernstein (1960); Brandes (1970);
Nelson (1975); Jacoby (1985)). The so-called “welfare work” became a nation-wide movement
during WWI, as numerous ﬁrms introduced a variety of employer-sponsored programs in order
to attract workers and preempt labor discontent. The early movement was often characterized
by its paternalistic nature, piecemeal formulation, and erratic implementation (BLS (1913);
Brandes (1970)), and many ﬁrms abandoned their programs once the postwar recession reversed
the economic conditions (Nelson (1975), pp.100-7). Among the employers who had continued
to experiment, however, corporate welfare programs matured into more sophisticated corporate
programs with sounder ﬁnancial bases and more impartial administration.3 Although union
avoidance continued to be a strong motive, it became less important in the 1920s among major
employers who emphasized economic eﬃciency.4 Distinguishing the latter movement from the
earlier welfare work, I deﬁne corporate welfarism as a set of comprehensive personnel programs
pertaining to blue-collar workers that developed after WWI.
The most comprehensive survey on corporate employment practices was conducted by the
leading employers association, the National Industrial Conference Board, in 1928, covering over
6,000 industrial establishments (NICB (1929)). As Table 1 shows, larger establishments were
more likely to have any given program, but even among the large plants with more than 250
workers, only a minority of them instituted these programs. The NICB study listed a wide
variety of personnel programs, extending from non-wage beneﬁts to training and education,
health and safety, housing and dining, social and recreational activities, and employee relations
programs. Contemporary scholars, as well as historians, saw little coherence among diverse
personnel activities and made little attempt to examine their interrelations. Bureau of Labor
Statistics oﬃcials deﬁned personnel work as “anything for the comfort and improvement, intel-
3These employers included Bethlehem Steel, Du Pont, Eastman Kodak, General Electric, General Motors,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber, International Harvester, Procter & Gamble, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and U.S.
Steel.
4Slichter (1929); NICB (1931); Hicks (1941), p.43 and p.108; Berkowitz & McQaid (1980), p.56; Jacoby (1985),
p.159; Cohen (1990); Kaufman & Taras (2000), p.39.
6lectual or social, of the employees, over and above wages paid, which is not a necessity of the
industry nor required by law,” or as Bernstein simply puts it, it was the “congeries of policies”
embracing numerous features (BLS (1913); Bernstein (1960), p.174). Why did some employers
oﬀer a variety of non-wage beneﬁts and services to their blue-collar workers beyond legal obliga-
tion? Why did employers, rather than markets, supply them? Could these programs generate
returns greater than their costs? In addition to the managerial domination theory, I consider
three economic rationales for corporate welfarism.5
First of all, incomplete markets may give ﬁrms an advantage in providing these services. For
example, when ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, ﬁrms may proﬁt by oﬀering their employees
risk sharing and consumption smoothing in the form of life insurance, accident beneﬁts, savings
plans, and housing loans. Similarly, employers may have an advantage over markets in provid-
ing location-speciﬁc goods, such as medical services, safety education, on-the-job training, and
recreational activities. Other non-market institutions, most notably governments and unions,
could and did supply some of these services, but the relative absence of the welfare state and
the limited reach of trade unionism prior to the 1930s gave American employers a substantial
ﬁrst-mover advantage (Berkowitz & McQaid (1980)). When employers were indeed a more eﬃ-
cient provider of the goods than markets, they could either charge premiums to their employees
or lower wages by an equivalent amount (i.e., compensating wage diﬀerentials) to reap proﬁts
from these activities.6
Although the incomplete market hypothesis seems to ﬁt well with historical observations,
it leaves some contractual features unexplained. First, evidence indicates that, although there
certainly were cases in which beneﬁts were substitutes for wages, most welfare capitalists were
leading manufacturing employers who provided beneﬁts and services at substantial discounts,
if not free, to employees and paid wages that were above industry and regional averages (BLS
(1928)). Second, as elaborated below, company records reveal that in most beneﬁt plans the
amount of the beneﬁt was made contingent on employees’ characteristics. If employers were
simply substituting for markets, why would they leave positive rents to employees and distribute
the rents according to employee characteristics? Third, the incomplete market hypothesis would
5For related work, see Fishback (1992) for corporate welfarism in coal mining and Alston & Ferrie (1999) for
agricultural paternalism.
6See Fishback & Kantor (1995) for compensating wage diﬀerentials in the context of workers’ compensation.
7not explain the adoption of such programs as company picnics, centralized employment, and
employee representation plans, which were often simultaneously introduced.
An alternative hypothesis is suggested by implicit contract theory (MacLeod & Malcomson
(1989)). According to the theory, employers may oﬀer eﬃciency wage or performance pay to
employees contingent on the level of non-contractable eﬀort, i.e., eﬀort that is observable within
an organization but unveriﬁable to a third party (Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984); Baker, Gibbons &
Murphy (1994)).7 Employers have an incentive to design such an implicit contract if greater
employee eﬀort generates positive returns after compensating for the disutility of eﬀort. However,
since an implicit contract is by deﬁnition not legally enforceable, it requires internal enforcement
mechanisms that compel both employers and employees to conform to the proposed contractual
terms. The hypothesis thus indicates that management may install enforcement institutions
together with pecuniary beneﬁt plans.
Many of the corporate programs, such as pension and stockownership plans, however, promised
beneﬁts that would accrue over a long time period. Why did employers oﬀer long-term contracts
to their factory workers? In contrast to static eﬃciency wage theory, human capital theory pro-
vides the reasons for dynamic contracting. It indicates that employers may design long-term
contractual arrangements, such as employment guarantee, internal promotion, seniority wages,
and deferred compensation, to encourage employees to acquire desirable human capital and to
reduce employee turnover (Lazear (1979); Prendergast (1993); Kanemoto & MacLeod (1989)).
The human capital hypothesis predicts that the rise of systematic corporate training would be
accompanied by a set of long-term incentive contracts.
2.2 The Contractual Nature of Corporate Welfarism
The above three hypotheses are theoretically distinct but not mutually exclusive.8 I ﬁrst examine
the nature of corporate programs using qualitative evidence, and then develop a theoretical
framework which is based on implicit contract theory with non-contractable employee human
capital. For clearer exposition, I divide personnel programs into three categories, (a) long-term
7An implicit contract is deﬁned as a contract that is not legally-enforceable, and an explicit contract is deﬁned
as a contract that is legally enforceable.
8Although the relative importance of the three rationales in motivating welfare capitalists is an important
empirical question, diﬀerentiating these hypotheses requires far better data than are available and is beyond the
scope of this paper.
8incentive contracts, (b) human capital investment, and (c) internal enforcement mechanisms, in
the following discussion.
Historical evidence indicates that a central element of corporate welfarism was a long-term
incentive contract that oﬀered beneﬁts and services contingent on employees’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure
and other characteristics such as merit, workmanship, loyalty, and reliability. Corporate records
reveal that many personnel programs exhibited this contractual feature: retirement pension,
supplementary bonuses, group insurance, accident and sickness beneﬁts, proﬁt sharing plans,
stock ownership plans, savings and investment plans, paid vacations, housing loans, internal
promotion, and, in some cases, medical services. In these programs, an amount of beneﬁts
received by employees was deﬁned as an increasing function of employee’s length of service,
while management retained the right to grant, withhold, reduce or terminate the beneﬁts in
individual cases.9
As emphasized by contemporary management, the provision of beneﬁts surpassed the legal
obligations speciﬁed by state-level workers’ compensation laws. Moreover, both employee’s
tenure and characteristics were non-contractable variables because any employment contracts
longer than one year were not enforced by court under the employment-at-will principle, whereas
the characteristics such as “workmanship” and “loyalty” were non-veriﬁable to a third party.
Thus, private welfare provision was based on an implicit contract that conferred no legal rights
upon employees, and therefore management could modify or abandon them if so desired with
legal impunity (BLS (1919), p.11; BLS (1928), p.74).10 In the words of contemporary economist
John R. Commons, even though employers often made pledges not to renege on the plan once it
was granted, that promise “rested on the integrity of the company alone” (Commons, Lescohier
9At International Harvester, its pension plan speciﬁed the amount of annual payment based on the years of
service and wages, while stipulating that its establishment “shall not be held as creating a contract or giving to
any employee a right to be retained in the service or any right to a pension” (Annual Report (1922); Ozanne
(1967), p.83). At Endicott Johnson, upon oﬀering company homes on liberal terms, employment oﬃcers took
charge of selecting qualiﬁed buyers to insure the only “desirable” workers with more than ﬁve years of service and
good employment records would be considered (Zahavi (1988), p.47). At General Electric, employees received
one week of paid vacation after 3 years of continuous service and two weeks after 10 years of service; management
also provided free life insurance starting from $500 up to $1,500 depending on an employee’s length of service and
employment records.
10An umber of law suits were ﬁled against management by employees who were disqualiﬁed from or denied
payments in proﬁt-sharing and pension plans. The courts consistently ruled in favor of companies on the ground
that, since these beneﬁts were mere gratuities on the part of employers, management had the sole right of
determining the conditions under which they should be paid. For early rulings, see BLS (1919), p.6.
9& Brandeis (1935), pp.338-9).
In the second category, human capital investment, a number of leading employers introduced
two-t oﬁ v e-year corporate apprenticeship courses, combining on-the-job training and in-class
instructions. Apprenticeship wages were set low and employees who had proved “meritorious” re-
ceived job oﬀers from their employer with higher wages upon graduation. The long-term human
capital investment was tied to a policy of internal promotion, which oﬀered career prospects to
production workers based on their merits, skills, and seniority.11 Major employers also oﬀered
safety and health education, disseminated practical information through employee magazine
and pamphlets, and set up a library for employees with general and technical references. Safety
committees were introduced not only to educate employees in accident prevention, but also to
encourage their initiative in eliminating hazardous working conditions. To utilize human capital
at the shop ﬂoor, some employers established a formal suggestion system with monetary awards
soliciting suggestions for eﬃciency improvements from blue-collar employees.12
With respect to the third category, the internal enforcement mechanisms, evidence suggests
that employers were generally concerned about the negative impact on employee morale, possible
labor disputes, and future recruitment that the termination of corporate beneﬁts might trigger.
Management argued that the best way to prevent labor conﬂicts was to build up a corporate
reputation for fair dealing and consideration of the interest of employees (NICB (1931), p.13).
At Kodak, a famous proﬁt-sharing plan was maintained despite changes in business conditions,
as management was afraid that “employees would misunderstand such a change and feel that
Kodak had reneged on a deal” (Jacoby (1997), p.79). At Endicott Johnson, managers felt that
they could not abandon their corporate welfarism “for fear of violating the explicit and implicit
expectations” it had created among employees (Zahavi (1988), p.143). Leading employers were
keenly aware that even though management could exercise its discretion in adopting a personnel
policy in the absence of state regulations, it was public opinion that would exercise compulsion
(NICB (1931), pp.15-8).
To facilitate internal enforcement, welfare capitalists instituted various personnel programs
11For instance, at DuPont, General Electric, General Motors, Goodyear, and Western Electric, corporate educa-
tion programs functioned as a means to identify and foster potential supervisory personnel (Allen (1943); Rumm
(1989), p.360; Nelson-Rowe (1991); Young & Tuttle (1969); Schacht (1975), p.14).
12At Goodyear and other ﬁrms, employees’ suggestions on workplace organization and machine improvement
led to an increase in productivity and improvement of product quality (Nelson (1982); Fairris (1997)).
10promoting communication, coordination, and employee involvement. To establish commitment,
management formalized welfare programs and announced their rules, regulations, and opera-
tions through bulletin boards, employee handbooks, and employee magazines. At Standard Oil
of New Jersey, for example, management distributed a printed labor policy to all employees so
that “every worker can always hold the company to its promised word” (Chase (1947), p.20). An
increasing number of employers set up beneﬁt funds, committing corporate resources ex ante to
meet future obligations. To facilitate bilateral communication and employee participation, lead-
ing employers set up suggestion systems, joint committees, and employee representation plans.
To ensure fair and consistent implementation, personnel policy was increasingly formed at the
corporate-level and personnel administration was centralized at a personnel department.13 Co-
ordinating employees’ expectations and promoting “co¨ operative” employer-employee relations
were also important. To build employee loyalty and corporate identity, many employers spon-
sored or assisted a wide variety of recreational activities and signaled their goodwill. Company
picnics, dance parties, employee clubs, and athletic teams, which involved employees and their
families, were regularly featured in employee magazines.
Furthermore, leading employers incorporated some form of joint administration in operating
welfare programs. The most formal expression of it was the adoption of an employee represen-
tation plan (ERP), also known as “company union.” Under the plan, employee representatives
would be elected from among blue-collar employees and regularly meet with management repre-
sentatives to discuss matters of mutual concern, including corporate welfare programs. As cor-
rectly criticized by labor historians, ERPs were by no means collective bargaining units compara-
ble to trade unions, as they were ﬁnancially dependent on management and given only advisory
power over limited subject matters. Nevertheless ERPs provided regular forums for employer-
employee communication and information sharing that previously had been non-existent.14 The
13To provide coordination within managerial ranks, top management instituted foremen training courses in an
eﬀort to check foremen’s decisions over hiring, ﬁring, and promotion that could undermine the corporate policy
for their often-noted arbitrariness and injustice. The personnel department compiled employee records, including
attendance, wages, length of service, and reasons for separation, which were essential in monitoring the behavior
of blue-collar employees as well as foremen.
14For instance, some employers noted that ERPs were used not only to communicate the details of personnel
policies but also to judge if these policies were successfully implemented; others observed that ERPs became
educational opportunities for both management and employees as they discussed various aspects of the plant
operation (Houser (1927), pp.15-20). At Bethlehem Steel, General Electric, and Standard Oil of New Jersey, a
considerable number of grievance cases brought by their ERPs were settled in favor of workers (Slichter (1929),
11plans also gave employees opportunities to participate in discussing personnel programs, voice
their concerns, and form collective opinions, and as such, once introduced, employers were of-
ten surprised by the amount of managerial time and commitment their ERPs required (Nelson
(1982); Ozanne (1967)).
Lastly, company-speciﬁc evidence suggests that, at least in a number of instances, corporate
welfarism became a mutually binding commitment between an employer and employees as a result
of their strategic interactions. For example, Zahavi (1988) describes the corporate welfarism at
Endicott Johnson as follows (p.105):
Although the workers expressed loyalty to the corporation, they repeatedly demon-
strated that their loyalty has limits and it had to be reciprocated by management.
Workers developed formal and informal strategies for extracting and expanding man-
agerial obligations [...]. The [corporate welfarism] became an autonomous reference
point and an independent code of just behavior, which allowed workers to judge
corporate policies and actions and which entrapped management.
2.3 Theoretical Framework: Implicit Contract Analysis
Based on the above observations, I characterize corporate welfarism as a set of employment
practices that constitutes an implicit contract equilibrium in a repeated employment game.15
More speciﬁcally, I consider a repeated game between an inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrm and over-lapping
generations of workers each of whom lives for two periods. I assume that each worker can invest
in human capital with a cost that will increase his labor productivity one period later. Human
capital, however, is non-contractable as it incorporates establishment-speciﬁc skills and knowl-
edge that are unveriﬁable by a third-party. To induce human capital investment, an employer
may oﬀer an implicit contract to a young worker that provides an employment guarantee for two
periods and promises extra compensation in the second period contingent on his human capital
acquisition.
Under which conditions can this implicit contract be self-enforcing? Based on the historical
observations, I assume reputation as a primary enforcement mechanism in which the employer’s
p.413; Schacht (1975); Gray & Gullett (1973)).
15A theoretical appendix is available from the author upon request; see Moriguchi (2001) for a formal analysis.
12breach of the contract will cause current and future employees to withdraw cooperation by,
for example, choosing the low level of eﬀort, not investing in human capital, and joining out-
side unions. As is well-known, the self-enforcement condition requires that the employer’s gain
from appropriating extra compensation be smaller than the present value of the future losses
resulting from such appropriation.16 If o cus on two particular subgame perfect Nash equilib-
ria of the repeated game that resemble spot contracting and corporate welfarism. The Spot
Contract Equilibrium (SCE) is characterized by a short-term employment contract and high
labor turnover; low level of human capital; the same basic wage paid in every period; and low
labor productivity. By contrast, the Implicit Contract Equilibrium (ICE) is characterized by a
long-term implicit employment contract and low labor turnover; a higher level of human capital;
extra compensation paid in the second period in addition to the basic wage; higher labor pro-
ductivity; and internal enforcement based on reputation. Note that the ICE is supported by a
set of reciprocal expectations in which an employer expects workers to acquire desirable human
capital and workers expect the ﬁrm to reward such investment when it materializes.
The above model generates implications that are consistent with the qualitative evidence
presented above and useful for further historical investigation.
1) Complementarity: the theory indicates that internal enforcement mechanisms are an
integral part of the ICE, suggesting complementarity among seemingly unrelated programs.
Observe, for example, that an eﬀective reputation mechanism requires not only workers’ ability
to monitor management behavior but also suﬃcient information transmission among workers
within an establishment.17 In contrast to a common view that the ﬁrm always beneﬁts when
it can “divide and conquer” workers, the model indicates that the ﬁrm may have an incentive
to facilitate coordination among employees and empower them to a certain degree to establish
credible commitment.
2) Existence & Eﬃciency: according to the model, the ICE outcome is always Pareto superior
to the SCE outcome. Why then did all ﬁrms not use implicit contracts? The self-enforcement
condition implies that a ﬁrm can establish credible commitment only if its time discount factor
is higher than a given threshold. The threshold discount factor is increasing in the size of
16See, for example, Baker et al. (1994).
17Forasimilar point, see Greif, Milgrom & Weingast (1994).
13compensation and decreasing in the returns from human capital investment and the quality
of internal enforcement. If smaller ﬁrms are less ﬁnancially stable and have a shorter time
horizon, the condition implies that smaller ﬁrms are less likely to adopt implicit contracts,
which is consistent with the evidence. The model further indicates that the ICE is vulnerable
to economic ﬂuctuations while the SCE is not. If a recession exogenously increases a ﬁrm’s
probability of bankruptcy and lowers its discount factor below the threshold, management will
no longer maintain its implicit contract; if the discount factor remains above the threshold,
however, management keeps the contract. This implication is explored in Section 4.
3) Multiple Equilibria & Coordination: the existence conditions for the equilibria imply that
when the ICE exists the SCE also exists. In the presence of multiple equilibria, management
cannot unilaterally “select” an equilibrium as its realization will depend on workers’ expecta-
tions. If workers believe that the ﬁrm would not honor its implicit contract, the ICE unravels
and degenerates to the spot contracting outcome, self-fulﬁlling the workers’ original expectations
even if the ICE is more eﬃcient. In other words, the two competing views of welfare capitalism
(managerial domination vs. eﬃciency improvement) emerge as equilibrium beliefs associated
respectively with the SCE and ICE in this model. This observation has two implications. First,
the coordination of expectations can be crucial in implementing the ICE. Although the formal
theory remains silent on how to achieve coordination, the evidence reviewed above suggests that
socialization, recreation activities, and bilateral communication could play an important role in
signaling employers’ goodwill and fostering mutual trust. Second, if workers have incomplete
information over their ﬁrm’s true type, once one of the two views becomes dominant in the
economy, the self-fulﬁlling nature of the belief may generate an externality that drives all ﬁrms
in the economy to converge to one equilibrium. This implication is explored in Section 5.
4) The Rise of the Explicit Contract Equilibrium: the model can be extended to show that
after the breakdown of the ICE and the reversion to the SCE, management and labor may
advance an alternative contractual arrangement based on third-party enforcement. That is, in
the presence of mutual distrust, the employer and workers may agree to develop contractable
“proxies” for non-contractable human capital and write a detailed and legally-enforceable con-
tract contingent on the proxies. The resulting equilibrium, the Explicit Contract Equilibrium
(ECE), can achieve higher eﬃciency than the SCE.
143 Corporate Welfarism in the U.S. and Japan in the 1920s
How prevalent was corporate welfarism in the U.S. prior to the Great Depression? Was the
movement in Japan comparable to that in the U.S. in its contractual nature as well as in its
prevalence? To address these questions, I present quantitative evidence using contemporary
surveys in the respective countries.
3.1 Corporate Welfarism in the U.S., 1920-29
Although corporate welfarism, deﬁned as a set of comprehensive personnel programs, was con-
ﬁned to a minority of large employers in the U.S. during the 1920s, it was a sizable minority
representing a growing trend. At the end of the decade, several hundred large American es-
tablishments practiced corporate welfarism, employing roughly 15 to 20 percent of production
workers in the U.S. Corporate expenditures on these programs were not trivial.
Two detailed studies by the BLS, which were conducted in 1917 and 1926 on overlapping
samples of 430 large plants, documented a trend in corporate welfarism among American ﬁrms
(BLS (1919, 1928); Fairris (1997), p.33). Despite the setback during the post-WWI recession,
the studies recorded a net increase in the number of establishments adopting major corporate
program between 1917 and 1926. Most notably, the percentage of establishments having group
insurance plans had increased from 7% to 43%; disability beneﬁt funds from 19% to 50%; paid
vacation plans from 4% to 37%; employee classes from 17% to 33%; and recreational facilities
from 35% to 55%. The percentage of establishments instituting joint administration of personnel
programs rose to 80% from 46%. Although not covered by the BLS studies, the number of ﬁrms
with formal retirement pension plans in the U.S. had more than doubled between 1915 and 1926
to 370 ﬁrms covering 4 million white- and blue-collar employees; the number of ﬁrms adopting
ERPs had increased from 145 to 399 between 1919 and 1928, covering more than 1.5 million
production workers (see Table 2); and the number of ﬁrms with stockownership plans for all
employees had doubled between 1921 and 1927 to about 280 ﬁrms.18
According to the 1926 BLS study, consistently over 30 percent of the 430 establishments
surveyed adopted major personnel programs, e.g., group life insurance, sickness and disability
18NICB (1925b); Epstein (1926); NICB (1925c); NICB (1933); NICB (1928b). The number of companies having
proﬁt sharing plans, by contrast, is likely to have declined during the 1920s (BLS (1917); BLS (1928)).
15beneﬁts, paid vacations, medical services, employee education, recreation and socialization, and
joint administration (BLS (1928)). According to the aforementioned 1928 NICB survey, consis-
tently over 20 percent of 1,676 large plants implemented major programs (see Table 1). What
cannot be inferred from these studies, however, is a distribution of personnel programs across
ﬁrms. Were these programs uniformly distributed or clustered to a small set of ﬁrms? Un-
fortunately, no micro-level data are available to test the correlations among diﬀerent programs
adopted; however, company-level evidence suggests that large establishments tended to adopt
a set of comprehensive programs “en bloc,” combining ﬁnancial incentives, corporate training,
centralized personnel management, and some form of employee participation (Jacoby (1985),
p.118; Moriguchi (2002)).19 If the positive correlations are assumed, Table 1 indicates that
there were 400 to 600 establishments in the U.S. adopting relatively comprehensive personnel
programs at the end of the 1920s.
How costly was it to implement corporate welfarism? A 1923 study by the American Man-
agement Association found the average expense for personnel activities of 90 ﬁrms to be 1.53%
of total annual payroll; the 1926 BLS study found the average welfare expenditures of 190 com-
panies to be $27 or about 2% of wage earner’s annual payroll; the 1928 NICB study found the
average of approximately 400 small establishments to be $26.65 or about 2% of annual factory
payroll; and a 1933 NICB study found the median cost of some 70 large establishments to be
$14.06 or 1.85% of payroll.20 These observations led Jacoby (1985) to conclude that, “despite
the high-minded rhetoric that accompanied it, few companies spent enough [...] to have had
a widespread eﬀect on worker loyalty or economic security” (p.199). The same data, however,
also indicate considerable inter-ﬁrm variation; the 1926 BLS study reported the cost ranging
from $14 to $120 among the sample establishments and the 1933 NICB study from $1.36 to
$175.40. To assess the cost of implementing comprehensive welfare programs, I estimate the
corporate expenditures on fourteen personnel program for which data are available (see Table
3).21 The most expensive program was proﬁt sharing, followed by supplemental bonuses and
19A 1923 study by the American Management Association, which surveyed 90 plants on 10 personnel activities,
found that plants with more than 1,500 employees had adopted on average 7.7 personnel activities, whereas plants
with less than 500 employees had adopted only 2.2 activities (AMA (1925)).
20AMA (1925); BLS (1928); NICB (1929); NICB (1934).
21AMA (1925); NICB (1925a); NICB (1928a); NICB (1929); NICB (1934); Epstein (1926); BLS (1927); BLS
(1928).
16paid vacations. Table 3 indicates that, if a ﬁrm adopted all of the fourteen programs listed, total
cost would have been 12% of annual payroll. When less prevalent programs (i.e., proﬁt sharing
and supplemental bonuses) were excluded, the welfare expenditures would have been about 6%
of payroll.22
3.2 Corporate Welfarism in Japan, 1920-29
The growth of corporate welfare programs pertaining to factory workers (shokk¯ o)i nJapan in the
early twentieth century is relatively well-documented (Hy¯ od¯ o (1971); Hazama (1978); Gordon
(1985)). Early welfare work, referred to as “keiei onj¯ o shugi”o remployer paternalism, was
often erratic, short-lived, and an inferior substitute for wages. With the rapid growth of capital-
intensive manufacturing industries, however, corporate welfarism in Japan matured into more
systematic and substantive programs after WWI (Ky¯ och¯ okai (1929), Chapter 18).23 By the end
of the 1920s, a few hundred Japanese establishments adopted fairly comprehensive personnel
programs. However, the movement in Japan was also conﬁned to leading employers, covering
no more than one-ﬁfth of the nation’s production workers.
The only available survey on corporate welfare practices in the 1920s was by the semi-public
research institution Ky¯ och¯ okai in 1921, which covered 157 large private plants employing 300
or more workers. As Table 4 shows, major employers instituted retirement pension plans,
sickness and death beneﬁts for employees and their families, length-of-service bonuses, proﬁt
sharing bonuses, stock ownership plans, savings plans, company housing, and medical services
for their blue-collar workers, all of which surpassed minimum legal requirements.24 Table 4 also
reports the ﬁndings of the 1932 survey by the Social Bureau of the Home Ministry, covering
2,310 private plants with 100 or more workers.25 Similar to American corporate welfarism, these
corporate programs were implicit contracts that conferred no legal rights upon employees, and
22Note that no data are available for stock ownership plans, savings plans, and ERPs. As evidence suggests
that these were relatively costly plans, the average expenditures could be higher if a ﬁrm adopted these plans.
23Large zaibatsu-aﬃliated ﬁrms in heavy industries, such as Hitachi Engineering Work, Ishikawajima Shipyards,
Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsubishi Shipyards, Nippon Steel, ¯ Oji Paper, Onoda Cement, Shibaura Engineering Work,
Sumitomo Electric Wire, were the major proponents of corporate welfarism.
24The 1926 Revised Factory Law mandated fourteen days wages as a severance pay in the case of dismissals
due to business reasons and the 1928 Health Insurance Law obligated employers to provide injury, sickness, and
death beneﬁts.
25Ky¯ och¯ okai (1924); Shakaikyoku (1933); Shakaikyoku (1934). To maintain comparability with the U.S. data,
government-owned plants are not included in Table 4.
17management retained the right to change or deny beneﬁts on an individual basis depending
on employee characteristics.26 At ypical retirement allowance plan (taishoku teate seido), the
equivalent of a lump-sum pension and dismissal compensation combined, speciﬁed the amount of
allowance paid upon separating from a company contingent on an employee’s length of service,
age, and the reason for separation.27
To encourage human capital investment, major Japanese employers set up formal training
programs for employees as well as supplemental education programs, lectures, and company
libraries. In particular, leading manufacturing employers instituted corporate schools (shokk¯ o
gakk¯ o)t ofoster skilled and semi-skilled employees in-house rather than relying on public schools,
and adopted a policy of internal promotion (Hy¯ od¯ o (1971), p.407; Hazama (1978), p.513). Uraga
Dock, for example, oﬀered a corporate apprenticeship contract that speciﬁed a three to ﬁve year
training period with periodic wage raises and compulsory savings, which would pay out the sav-
ings and interest only if the apprentice completed the training and stayed with the company for
ﬁve years afterwards (Hy¯ od¯ o (1971), p.407; Gordon (1985), pp.103-6). At Mitsubishi Shipyards
and Hitachi Engineering Works, employers established corporate schools and gradually reduced
mid-career hiring in favor of workers who graduated from company training programs (Hazama
(1978), p.513).
Japanese management also sponsored various recreational and social activities including
company picnics, ﬁeld days, motion pictures, and athletic competitions, and promoted the spirit
of employer-employee cooperation. Many major enterprises established personnel sections and
personnel managers were put in charge of careful screening for hiring new workers, enforcement
of work discipline, evaluation of employees, and administration of personnel programs.28 A
growing tendency toward employee involvement was also seen among Japanese establishments.
An increasing number of employers established mutual aid associations, ERPs (typically called
“k¯ oj¯ o iinkai”o rfactory councils), or less formal employee organizations, through which factory
employees took part in administrating corporate welfare programs (Ky¯ och¯ okai (1929), pp.912-3).
26See Hy¯ od¯ o (1971), pp.327-9; Hazama (1978), p.521; Sumiya (1966), p.135. For example, in introducing
seniority bonuses for factory workers, Nippon Steel required employees not only to have a minimum ﬁve years of
service but also to be deemed “diligent, loyal, and decent-mannered” by management; at Mitsubishi Shipyards,
management retained full authority to determine the number of workers receiving a pay raise as well as the amount
of the raise, based on merit, skill, and diligence of individual employees.
27Ky¯ och¯ okai (1924); Zensanren (1932), p.5; Shakaikyoku (1936), pp.61-2.
28Hazama (1978), pp.512–3; Sh¯ owa D¯ ojin-kai (1960), p.274; Hy¯ od¯ o (1971), pp.436-7; Gordon (1985), p.110.
18As in the U.S., ERPs were only a consultative body whose primary objective was to facilitate
communication and build trust between employers and employees. In most ERPs, management
in the beginning tried to conﬁne the agenda of council meetings to the enhancement of workers’
welfare and productivity. Once introduced, however, ERPs gave workers some voice in formu-
lating personnel policies.29 As corporate programs became more permanent institutions, many
large companies established welfare funds for their employee beneﬁt plans and committed cor-
porate resources to improve ﬁnancial soundness in the 1920s (Ky¯ och¯ okai (1924); Gordon (1985),
pp.110-4; Ky¯ och¯ okai (1929), pp.910-2).
The similarity between private welfare capitalism in the U.S. and Japan was often a result of
direct and indirect learning. Major employers in both countries learned from British and German
precedents, and leading Japanese employers studied American practices as a possible role model.
For example, a researcher at Mitsubishi was sent to the U.S. speciﬁcally to collect data on
corporate personnel policies. A manager at Sumitomo Electric Wire established ERPs modeled
after International Harvester and Standard Oil plans after visiting American ﬁrms. The BLS
and NICB studies were closely followed by contemporary Japanese scholars and bureaucrats.30
How prevalent was corporate welfarism in Japan? Although available quantitative data in
the 1920s are limited, evidence suggests that the movement in Japan was also conﬁned to a
minority of leading ﬁrms consisting of 200 to 300 establishments. According to Table 4, in 1932,
consistently over 200 plants adopted major incentive contracts, training programs, socialization
activities, and joint administration and other forms of employee involvement. Yet, only 112
establishments in Japan had ERPs in 1929, and only 132 out of 256 large establishments surveyed
had formal retirement allowance plans in 1930 (Ky¯ och¯ okai (1932)). In the late 1920s, there were
about 200 private establishments employing 1,000 or more workers in Japan, which together
employed approximately 400,000 workers or 20 percent of total production workers. Although
29At Sumitomo factories, workers protested when management refused to discuss subjects proposed by employee
representatives concerning standards for awarding supplementary bonuses, changes in incentive wages, and revision
of the retirement allowance plan. Eventually, management conceded to include those issues as subjects for
consultation. Similarly, at Mitsubishi Shipyards, three years after the introduction of its ERP, management
allowed basic working conditions to be discussed at the ERP meetings in response to growing employees’ demand
(Hazama (1978), p.532; Hy¯ od¯ o (1971), pp.399-402). At Uraga, as its mutual aid society gave workers control over
a part of welfare programs, what management once thought of company benevolence became “the fulﬁllment of
a company obligation” to its workers (Gordon (1985), p.113).
30Ky¯ och¯ okai (1920); Ky¯ och¯ okai (1921); Mitsubishi G¯ oshi (1921); Ky¯ och¯ okai (1929), Chapter 9; Mimura (1930);
Zensanren (1932a).
19these establishments did not entirely coincide with the set of welfare capitalists, since there
wasasigniﬁcant overlap, I use 20 percent as an upper bound for the percentage of workers
employed by welfare capitalists in Japan. The data on welfare expenditures were reported in
a 1926 survey by a leading employers’ association, Japan Industrial Club (NKK (1928)). The
average expenditures on personnel programs of 62 leading companies were 32.41 yen or 10.7
percent of the annual payroll. In textiles and mining, however, the expenditures exceeded 20
percent of factory payrolls due to substantially lower wages paid in these industries. If these
two industries are excluded from the sample, the average corporate expenditures on personnel
programs were 7.9 percent of the annual payroll.
In summary, at the end of the 1920s, in both the U.S. and Japan, corporate welfarism was
conﬁned to a small set of large establishments in capital-intensive industries, covering no more
than 20 percent of production workers. In other words, the nature of corporate welfarism and
its prevalence in the economy in the late 1920s were roughly comparable between the U.S. and
Japan.
3.3 The Impact of Corporate Welfarism in the 1920s
Toward the end of the decade, the two countries experienced common trends that were attributed
to the diﬀusion of corporate welfarism by contemporary observers. First, as Figure 1 shows,
labor turnover of factory workers declined in the 1920s in both countries. In the U.S., both
aggregate-level data and company-level evidence indicate a statistically signiﬁcant decline in
turnover rates in the 1920s.31 Although aggregate-level data for Japan are less reliable and
unavailable before 1923, combined with regional surveys and establishment-speciﬁc evidence,
the data indicate a decline in labor turnover of Japanese workers during the 1920s.32
Second, the union movement in large establishments subsided in the 1920s in both countries.
In the U.S., the number of work stoppages remained low after 1922 despite economic prosperity.
Union membership fell by 14 percent between 1922 and 1928 to 3.5 million, while the number
of employees covered by ERPs doubled to 1.5 million (Table 2). After examining corporate
welfare practices, a contemporary leftist warned in 1927 that the trade unions in this country
31Berridge (1929); Sundstrom (1986), Chapter 3; Owen (1995a); Owen (1995b); Whatley & Sedo (1997).
32NRUS (1959), II-60; Hy¯ od¯ o (1971), p.405; Sumiya (1966), p.132; Odaka (1984), p.205; Nishinarita (1988),
p.327.
20face in these practices a challenge to their very existence (Dunn (1927)). In Japan, although
union membership increased steadily and the number of labor disputes remained relatively high
throughout the 1920s, the center of the union movement shifted to small establishments by the
end of the decade. In both the U.S. and Japan, despite repeated organization drives by existing
unions, leading manufacturing establishments remained unorganized in the twenties (Bernstein
(1960); Komatsu (1971)). Major proponents of corporate welfarism in the respective countries
claimed that the low turnover, stable workforce, and labor-management cooperation were the
result of their personnel policies. Although causal relations are diﬃcult to establish and are
in dispute (Jacoby (1985); Gordon (1985)), the above trends lent credibility to private welfare
capitalists in the eyes of contemporaries.
Lastly, even though corporate welfarism was conﬁned to a minority of employers in the U.S.
and Japan, since its leading proponents were industry leaders, they had substantial political
inﬂuence in both countries. In the U.S., starting as a secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover
became a promoter of “voluntarist corporatism” endorsing private welfare capitalism (Hawley
(1979), p.68; Fausold (1985), pp.119-120). Similarly, in Japan, the zaibatsu leaders had close
ties with politicians or were themselves members of the Diet. The governments in the respec-
tive countries supported private initiatives in industrial welfare and took a stance against trade
unionism. In short, private welfare capitalism enjoyed growing political, intellectual, and so-
cial support during the 1920s in the respective countries (Berkowitz & McQaid (1980); Garon
(1988)).
4 The Challenge of the Great Depression
Among industrialized nations, the U.S. experienced the deepest and longest Great Depression
while Japan experienced one of the mildest. U.S. industrial production fell by 50 percent in 1929-
32 and did not fully recover to the 1929 level for over a decade; by contrast, Japan’s industrial
production declined by less than 10 percent in 1929-31 and returned to the pre-depression level
by 1933 (Figure 2). Consistent with the theoretical prediction, during the initial years when
the depression was less severe, business leaders in both countries tried to maintain their implicit
contracts. However, the diﬀerence in the magnitude and duration of the depression eventually
led to divergent responses of American and Japanese employers, resulting in the bifurcation of
21institutional trajectories in the two countries.
4.1 The Great Depression and Broken Promises in the U.S.
For the ﬁrst two years of the depression in the U.S., the proponents of corporate welfarism
made a considerable eﬀort to keep their promises, expecting that the depression would soon
end. Supporting employers’ private eﬀort, the Hoover administration urged business leaders not
to reduce wages and promoted a national “share-the-work” movement to prevent mass unem-
ployment. In contrast to today’s U.S. corporate practices, in an eﬀort to protect their workforce,
major companies ceased hiring, reduced hours, transferred employees to diﬀerent departments,
and cut executive salaries (NICB (1930), p.36; Balderston (1933), p.261). International Har-
vester, for instance, instituted a policy to produce goods beyond present demand to create extra
work (Ozanne (1967), pp.141-6). Western Electric reported in 1931 that shortened hours made
it possible to retain all employees with “long service and experience” (Annual Report (1931),
p.9). Leading ﬁrms also sponsored company relief programs, such as food baskets, cash loans,
and rent subsidies for their employees.
The economy, however, continued to deteriorate: by late 1931, industrial production was
30 percent below the 1929 level, while tight monetary policy and multiple bank crises imposed
serious liquidity constraints on ﬁrms (Friedman & Schwartz (1963); Hunter (1982)). In the fall
of 1931, major business leaders announced wage reductions. In June 1932, the level of industrial
production was 60 percent below its 1929 peak, and the stock price index declined by more
than 70 percent. By 1933 a majority of the proponents of corporate welfarism repudiated their
implicit contracts, not only by withdrawing corporate beneﬁts at the “time of the employees’
greatest need,” but also by implementing large-scale dismissals despite their earlier pledge to
provide employment security in exchange of reduced work hours (Schatz (1983), p.61).
According to an NICB study that surveyed 233 establishments in 1934, personnel programs
that showed the highest rate of discontinuation were: employee stock ownership (52%), employee
magazines (49%), paid vacation for wage earners (43%), social and recreational activities (38%),
proﬁt sharing (35%), corporate training (26%), home purchase plans (24%), and suggestion
systems (18%) (NICB (1934)). By contrast, a low rate of discontinuation was reported in
pension plans (6.8%), ERPs (5.7%), safety committees (3.4%), centralized employment (2.2%),
22and group life insurance (1.2%). As Fairris (1997) points out, the ﬁndings do not support the
often-held claim that private welfare capitalism fell apart during the depression. Nevertheless, his
conclusion that its basic structure remained “largely intact” also calls for reassessment (p.61).
The NICB survey likely understates the impact of the depression on corporate welfarism in
at least three ways: ﬁrst, the sample is biased towards very large establishments employing
on average over 2,000 workers; second, company records indicate that downward revision and
temporary suspension of welfare plans, which were unreported in the survey, were more prevalent
than discontinuation (Moriguchi (2002)); and lastly, even if plans were in operation, the number
of eligible workers fell drastically as most ﬁrms resorted to massive layoﬀs by 1932.33 Latimer
(1932) found that, by 1932, 10% of company pension plans were discontinued or suspended,
another 10% curtailed the amount of beneﬁts, and still others raised the amount of employee
contribution (p.847). Over one hundred ERPs or 12% were discontinued between 1928 and 1932
(Table 2) and more became inactive as most employers preferred not to ask ERP’s approval for
every wage cut and beneﬁt revision (Ozanne (1967), p.146). Even the largest ﬁrms could not
avoid dismissals: between 1929 and 1932, Bethlehem Steel and General Electric reduced their
workforces by 50%, International Harvester by 58%, and Ford by 72%. While the unemployment
rate rose to 25%, the extent of private dismissal compensation covering blue-collar workers was
limited. A BLS study in 1932 found that only 18 out of 224 manufacturing establishments paid
such compensation (BLS (1932)).34
As a consequence, workers’ beliefs in their employers’ goodwill were considerably under-
mined. As Brody (1979) and Cohen (1990) emphasize, since American welfare capitalists had
raised employees’ expectations, their broken promises all the more generated a deep sense of
disappointment if not betrayal.35 The work sharing reduced work hours so severely that work-
ers who kept their jobs received what they called “starvation wages.” Employees who initially
cooperated with management to institute work sharing thus grew increasingly dissatisﬁed. In
addition, when employers eventually resorted to layoﬀs, management typically used subjec-
33As mentioned above, most beneﬁt payments were contingent on employment status, and moreover, accord-
ing to typical continuous service provisions, workers who were laid-oﬀ for longer than a speciﬁed period (most
commonly 6 or 12 months) lost their continuous service records and corresponding beneﬁts (NICB (1939a), p.10;
NICB (1939b), pp.11-2).
34An NICB survey found 153 concerns with active dismissal compensation plans in the early 1930s, but many
of them were exclusively for white-collar employees (NICB (1937)).
35Brody (1979), p.242; Cohen (1990), pp.238-46.
23tive criteria combining merit, seniority, and family needs, which inﬂamed discontent among
workers.36 Some workers were “disillusioned” by the loss of their savings especially when they
had been advised by their companies to enter an unsound investment; some called their years
of regular contributions to corporate programs “money thrown away”; some felt “heartbroken”
when their company unilaterally eliminated the annual bonus which they had expected as part
of annual compensation; some resented management for the loss of company houses when they
could not maintain their payments; and some even blamed management that their layoﬀs were
motivated by employers’ desire to avoid paying principal beneﬁts promised after certain years
of service.37 AF ord worker bitterly wrote to an AFL union leader in 1933 that he had “spent
a lifetime helping to create a millionaire” when the company dismissed him.38 Disturbed by
reduced work, beneﬁts, and employment, a small group of skilled workers at General Electric
secretly began organizing a union in 1932 (Schatz (1983), p.63; Millis et al. (1942), p.751). In
early 1933, prominent industrial relations scholar William Leiserson remarked that “this depres-
sion had undone ﬁfteen years or so of good personnel work” and consequently “labor is going to
look to legislation and not to personnel management for a solution.”39
According to the implicit contract theory, once workers perceive that their employer has
breached the contract, they mistrust management and withdraw any future cooperation. One
may assert, however, that since workers observed the macro economic conditions, management
should have been able to convince workers that the depression was an extraordinary and unfore-
seen contingency. Historical evidence suggests that such renegotiation might have been diﬃcult.
Most factory workers did not possess suﬃcient information about their ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condi-
tions to assess whether management’s breach of contract was justiﬁable. Employers’ eﬀorts to
provide such information in a number of ﬁrms met with skepticism as workers saw no incen-
tive for management to report truthfully. Their mistrust was reinforced partly by the fact that
management often maintained corporate programs pertaining to white-collar employees while
discontinuing those pertaining to blue-collar workers.40 Moreover, high rates of discontinuation
36Commons et al. (1935), p.244; Schatz (1983), p.61.
37Balderston (1933), p.265; Cohen (1990), p.240; Zahavi (1988), p.133; Fine (1969), p.26.
38V. French to W. Green (1933) quoted in Brody (1980), p.77.
39His address reprinted in Management Review 22 (1933), pp.114-5.
40For example, according to NICB (1934), only 8.5% of paid vacation plans for salaried employees were discon-
tinued, compared to 43% for wage employees. For company-speciﬁc evidence, see Moriguchi (2002).
24in employee magazines, social activities, suggestion systems, and ERP meetings during the de-
pression indicate that there was a general breakdown of labor-management communication at a
critical moment that might have made renegotiation even more diﬃcult.
4.2 The Great Depression and Kept Promises in Japan
Though mild by international standards, Japan’s 1929 depression was the deepest recession in
the nation’s history, and as such, it seriously challenged managerial commitment. As industrial
demand contracted by 8 percent in 1929-31, a large number of ﬁrms announced pay cuts and
layoﬀs. In response, the number of labor disputes opposing these measures surged. As unem-
ployment rose sharply, the Japanese government urged employers to avoid mass dismissals.41
As in the U.S., the leading proponents of corporate welfarism tried to circumvent layoﬀs by
freezing new hiring, reducing hours, relocating workers, and creating relief work within the
establishment.42 When the reduction of the workforce became inevitable, leading employers
proposed to augment the amount of retirement allowance and solicited “voluntary” retirement
from among employees. Table 5 reports the amount of retirement allowances stipulated in
142 formal plans in large establishments (employing 200 or more workers) in 1932. The ﬁrst
column shows the average payment schedule for the retirement due to employees’ personal rea-
sons (the equivalent of a lump-sum pension) and the second column shows the average payment
schedule for the retirement due to business reasons (i.e., the augmented allowance for voluntary
retirement).43 The diﬀerence between the two allowances eﬀectively is dismissal compensation,
which is reported in the last column. The amount of the proposed dismissal compensation
increased substantially with an employee’s length of service.
Whether or not major employers adhered to their promises during the depression can be
partially inferred from annual government surveys of retirement allowances covering over 5,000
private factories employing 50 or more workers (see Table 6). At the trough of the depression,
the number of workers dismissed due to business reasons increased to 59,000 or 5.3 percent of
total employment in the sample, and the percentage of these workers receiving any allowances
41Odaka (1984), p.203; NRUS (1959), pp.468-9; Gordon (1985), pp.145-7; Saguchi (1977), pp.211-6.
42Hazama (1978), pp.508-10; Gordon (1985), p.203.
43Zensanren (1932b); Zensanren (1932c).
25declined from 72 to 60 percent.44 Among those who received allowances, however, the amount
perw orker increased sharply from 41 days in 1929 to over 182 days in 1931, far surpassing
the legal requirement of fourteen days of wages. The high level of the average payment during
the depression indicates that workers with relatively long tenure were induced to retire under
the augmented retirement allowance plan, as well as that a majority of the establishments
with such plans did honor their promises. Company-speciﬁc evidence suggests that the system
of voluntary retirement was often eﬀective in moderating workers’ discontent associated with
large-scale dismissals and helped maintain the morale of the remaining employees. Many workers
who were exhorted to retire saw a non-trivial sum of money provided by management as a token
of goodwill.45 During the depression, a number of leading employers used ERPs to communicate
managerial decisions, discuss the amount of retirement allowances, solicit employees to accept
voluntary retirement, and organize relief work (Nishinarita (1988), pp.183-92).
Although it is diﬃcult to assess the impact of the depression on corporate welfarism as a
whole, a comprehensive three-volume government survey on the subject conducted in 1932 did
not report any major setbacks due to the depression.46 The Japan Industrial Club conducted
its second survey on welfare expenditures in 1931, at the trough of the depression, covering 118
large companies (NKK (1932)). The average welfare expenditures per employee were 41.94 yen
or 12.4 percent of the annual payroll; if textile and mining industries are excluded, the ﬁgure was
10.6 percent of the payroll. Although the 1926 and 1931 surveys are not directly comparable due
to sample diﬀerences, welfare expenditures as a percentage of payroll were higher in 1931 than
in 1926 in every manufacturing industry except for textiles. Corresponding to the observation
that major employers augmented retirement allowances, the percentage of expenditures spent
on allowances (i.e., retirement, dismissal, seniority allowances) in total expenditures rose from
39 percent in 1926 to 55 percent in 1931. Taken together, the evidence suggests that leading
employers maintained, if not increased, the level of their ﬁnancial commitment to personnel
programs despite declining corporate proﬁts.
44The mandatory payments did not apply to concerns ﬁling for bankruptcy.
45At aM itsubishi Shipyard, a worker with 18 years of service said: “As I have a large family and not much saving,
it is truly regrettable that I got ﬁred now [...], but it is fortunate to receive an excessive amount of retirement
allowance [...],” and similarly, a younger worker receiving retirement allowance stated that even though he was
unfortunate to be dismissed he did “understand the company’s situation” that necessitated such action (cited in
Nishinarita (1988), p.191, in the author’s translation).
46Shakaikyoku (1933); Shakaikyoku (1934). Quantitative data are reported in Table 4.
26Partly to mitigate the ﬁnancial burden, large Japanese ﬁrms developed a system of temporary
workers (rinji-ko seido) since the late 1920s. Previously, a common practice had been to promote
a temporary worker to a regular worker status after a short probationary period provided his
performance was satisfactory. Under the new system, the status of temporary workers was in
principle ﬁxed indeﬁnitely. Although temporary workers were not necessarily excluded from
corporate beneﬁt plans, they were deprived of employment security as management could and
did dismiss them without advance notice and retirement allowances.47 Contemporary employers
emphasized that the temporary worker system served as a necessary buﬀer to insulate their
regular “mainstay employees” from business ﬂuctuations.48
In short, during the depression, a majority of the proponents of corporate welfarism in Japan
maintained their implicit contracts, realizing that failing to do so would result in costly labor
disputes and a loss of employee morale. As noted by Gordon (1985), workers’ protest against
the elimination of existing beneﬁt plans gradually helped establish a belief that the beneﬁts
were part of the “just reward” that could not be withdrawn at management’s will (pp.196-206).
At the same time, leading employers modiﬁed existing practices and developed institutional
arrangements (i.e., voluntary retirement and temporary-worker systems) that would reduce the
cost of long-term commitment.
5 Endogenous Transformation of the “Rules of the Game”
The divergent managerial responses to the depression in the U.S. and Japan were reinforced by
concurrent government legislations that eventually changed “the rules of the game” for private
players. Although the intents of the government interventions in the two countries were similar,
I argue that the nature of labor laws was endogenously determined. In the early 1930s, the two
countries were at similar political crossroads, introducing collective bargaining and social welfare
legislation prompted by depression crises. However, reﬂecting the change in the relative power of
constituencies and the dominant beliefs in the societies, legislative outcomes diverged between
the two countries. In the U.S., the New Deal legal framework brought an end to corporate
47Temporary workers were hired under a renewable ﬁxed-term contract and received lower wages compared to
regular workers even though they performed similar tasks. See Nishinarita (1988), p.52; Sumiya (1966), p.134;
Odaka (1984), p.213.
48NRUS (1964), pp.123-48; Hy¯ od¯ o (1971), p.432; Hazama (1978), p.498.
27welfarism characterized by implicit contracts in most establishments, while Japanese labor laws
legitimized these practices.
5.1 The New Deal Labor Laws and the Rise of Explicit Contracts in the
U.S.
In the 1932 election, the Democrats won both the presidency and a majority in Congress.
The Roosevelt administration of 1932 critically relied on political support from progressive Re-
publicans who were disillusioned by Hoover.49 Reﬂecting his constituencies, Roosevelt’s ﬁrst
economic measure, the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, was primarily pro-
corporate legislation that granted business a long-sought antitrust exemption coupled with one
labor provision, Section 7(a).50 Labor leaders declared Section 7(a) the ﬁrst congressional sanc-
tion of trade unions in U.S. history, while business leaders claimed that it recognized ERPs
as an equally legitimate collective bargaining unit (Bernstein (1950), p.38; Bernstein (1969),
p.41). The NIRA thus set oﬀ a ﬁerce rivalry between trade unions and ERPs. The number of
labor disputes rose and union membership started to expand after 1933, while several hundred
ERPs were created anew under employers’ initiatives in 1933-35 (NICB (1933); Troy (1965)).
By the time the NIRA was declared unconstitutional, it had generated two largely unintended
outcomes: the failure to achieve economic recovery under business initiatives and the rise of
organized labor.51 The former led Roosevelt to abandon voluntarist corporatism inherited from
Hoover, while the latter enabled him to form a new political coalition with organized labor. As
a result, after the midterm election of 1934 in which the Democrats further gained, there was
an emerging rift between business leaders and the administration (Finegold & Skocpol (1995),
pp.136-8).
Against this political backdrop, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) and the Social Security Act in 1935. The Wagner Act was more than the reinstatement
of the NIRA Section 7(a): it prohibited employers from engaging in “unfair labor practices”
explicitly outlawing ERPs or any other employer-sponsored labor organizations, and established
49Finegold & Skocpol (1995), pp.45-7.
50Section 7(a) recognized the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing and prohibited employers from interfering with that right.
51In May 1935, the Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional as it granted undue power to the
President with vaguely deﬁned objectives in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (295 U.S. 495).
28the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) granting exclusive judicial power in industrial
relations. The Social Security Act introduced compulsory state unemployment compensation
and federal old-age pensions ﬁnanced by payroll taxes. Business leaders immediately launched a
campaign against the two Acts, emphasizing employers’ voluntary eﬀorts to improve employees’
welfare, and ﬁled legal challenges to their constitutionality.52 In the meantime, the passage of
the Wagner Act further stimulated the union movement: most notably, the newly-established
Committee of Industrial Organization (CIO) promoted industrial unionism in mass production
industries.
In 1936, Roosevelt won his second presidential election, securing labor’s support but further
alienating business.53 In the same year, endorsed by Congress, the La Follette Committee
began an investigation of employers’ infringements of civil liberties. Collaborating with the
NLRB, the Committee discovered that numerous American ﬁrms, including welfare capitalists
such as General Motors and U.S. Steel, had engaged in unlawful antiunion practices during the
NIRA period (Auerbach (1966), p.85).54 Since the La Follette congressional hearings generated
wide publicity, even though the nature and extent of the anti-labor practices varied substantially
across ﬁrms, the reputation of “progressive business” fell apart, making American private welfare
capitalism a synonym for antiunionism. Consequently, the investigation served to justify the
Wagner Act’s sweeping prohibition of unfair labor practices and mitigated the public sentiment
against radicalizing labor movement. Even though 4,720 strikes broke out in 1937 mobilizing
two million workers, as a clear departure from precedent, federal and state governments rarely
intervened against unions despite the unions’ obvious militancy (Goldstein (1978), pp.228-9).
In its watershed decision in 1937, the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the Wagner and Social
Security Acts.
The new legal framework had a far-reaching impact on corporate welfarism. Its ﬁrst im-
plication was the demise of ERPs. Between 1935 and 1941, the NLRB found 1,200 cases of
company-dominated labor organizations in violation of the Wagner Act and ordered their dises-
52Jacoby (1985), p.241; NICB (1936).
53Andersen (1979), pp.92-120; Finegold & Skocpol (1995), pp.136–8.
54According to the Committee’s ﬁndings, the most common antiunion practices were labor espionage, strike-
breaking, and munitioning; for example, the Committee found that, between 1933 and 1936, some 2,500 ﬁrms
hired 4,000 spies to inﬁltrate unions and that some ﬁrms spent a considerable sum of money on machine guns,
pistols, and other weapons to arm their strikebreakers and private police forces (Committee on Education and
Labor (1937a); Committee on Education and Labor (1937b)).
29tablishment. The newly created ERPs under the NIRA were particularly prone to this allegation.
After the court’s validation of the Wagner Act, however, the employers who had long-standing
ERPs, such as Bethlehem Steel, General Electric, and International Harvester, also had to dis-
solve their ERPs in compliance with the law. Although many of those ERPs were reconstituted
as so-called independent local unions, a majority of them lost against CIO- or AFL-aﬃliated
unions in subsequent unionization drives.55 By 1941, over 8 million workers had joined trade
unions, whereas the membership of ERPs (or independent local unions) declined to less than half
a million (Table 2). Major proponents of corporate welfarism, including Bethlehem Steel, Gen-
eral Electric, General Motors, Goodyear, International Harvester, and U.S. Steel, were organized
by industrial unions between 1936 and 1941.
The second implication of the New Deal labor laws was the rise of explicit employment con-
tracts in major establishments. As most employers fought aggressively against trade unions,
the process of union recognition were often confrontational and violent. As a consequence, ad-
versarial labor-management relations took root in most unionized establishments (Millis (1942);
Bernstein (1969)). According to the implicit contract theory, in the absence of mutual trust,
management and labor cannot sustain the implicit contract equilibrium. Instead of reverting to
spot contracting, however, they may institute a better contractual arrangement based on third-
party enforcement. Historical evidence suggests that adversarial labor-management relations led
to the development of explicit and elaborate union contracts. During the collective bargaining
process, leading employers recognized the merit of deﬁning explicit and detailed rules ex ante
in forestalling union grievances and protecting managerial prerogatives. Unions also preferred
establishing contractual rights based on objective and veriﬁable rules in minimizing managerial
discretion and demanded third-party arbitration in case of disagreements.56 Accordingly, man-
agement and labor in unionized establishments began to develop explicit contracts, characterized
by detailed job classiﬁcations and seniority rules, foreshadowing the “workplace contractualism”
of the postwar U.S. industrial relations system (Slichter (1941); Brody (1993)).
The third implication of the new legal framework was the decline of discretionary corpo-
55Troy (1965); Jacoby (2000).
56For example, major employers introduced formal methods of job analysis and evaluation to determine wage
rates, while major unions demanded the strict seniority principle in layoﬀs and promotions and the usage of
third-party arbitration in the grievance procedure (Jacoby (1985), pp.250-2; Brody (1993), p.180).
30rate beneﬁts pertaining to blue-collar workers in unionized plants. Since the Social Security Act
provided compulsory pensions and unemployment beneﬁts on a uniform basis, it diminished em-
ployers’ returns from providing beneﬁts to induce the acquisition of desirable human capital.57
With the introduction of the federal pensions, a number of welfare capitalist ﬁrms reduced or
discontinued their corporate pension plans for wage earners. Furthermore, most unions opposed
any discretionary beneﬁts unilaterally granted by employers and demanded to make the pay-
ment of such beneﬁts contractual obligations for the ﬁrm. In response, many major employers
eliminated extra compensation plans pertaining to blue-collar workers (e.g., employee stockown-
ership, proﬁt sharing, and bonus plans), or incorporating some plans into union contracts as
explicit beneﬁts based on seniority rights (e.g., paid vacations, group insurance).58
In summary, the New Deal labor laws imposed binding constraints on corporate welfarism
based on implicit contracts and internal enforcement mechanisms. Toward the early 1940s,
employment relations in major unionized U.S. establishments were increasingly characterized by
explicit contracts based on third-party enforcement.
5.2 Prewar Labor Laws and the Endorsement of Corporate Welfarism in
Japan
Although Japan was under the oligarchic regime before 1918, the elective Lower Diet gained
political power vis-` a-vis the peerage Upper Diet in the 1920s, giving rise to a brief period
of parliamentary democracy.59 In the Lower Diet, conservative and rural-based Seiy¯ ukai and
progressive and urban-based Minseit¯ o became two major political parties, alternately forming a
cabinet between 1924 and 1931 (Kawato (1992), pp.176-9). Drawing support from the working
class, Minseit¯ ow on a majority in the Lower Diet for the ﬁrst time in the 1930 election (Garon
(1988), pp.164-5). Prompted by the depression crisis, the Minseit¯ o cabinet introduced three
pieces of legislation to the Diet in 1930-32 that were comparable to New Deal legislation in
the U.S. during the same period: an economic recovery bill that would authorize business to
57As Berkowitz & McQaid (1980) and Tone (1997) emphasize, the Social Security Act incorporated aspects of
corporate welfare practices. As shown in the following section, however, the impact of corporate welfarism on
state welfare policies in the U.S. was far smaller than in Japan.
58Eventually the court decision in 1949 brought the terms of non-wage beneﬁts within the scope of collective
bargaining, upon which employers lost their discretion (Munts (1967); Harris (1982)).
59The Upper Diet possessed veto power, but by the 1920s, it was rare for peers to overrule any bills that received
wide public support, as the government could and did threaten the Upper Diet with peerage reform.
31form cartels, a trade union bill that would recognize workers’ collective bargaining rights, and a
national unemployment insurance bill (R¯ od¯ osh¯ o (1961), p.441).
Japanese employers immediately formed a united front against the trade union bill. Testi-
fying in the Diet, business leaders contended that the legal recognition of unions in the midst
of the depression would only intensify labor disputes and create grave consequences for indus-
trial development. Like American employers, they also claimed that such law would endanger
plant-level ERPs that had “greatly contributed” to the establishment of mutual trust between
management and labor (R¯ od¯ osh¯ o (1961), p.434). Government oﬃcials countered that corporate
welfarism rested entirely on the “whims of capitalists,” oﬀering no solution to the mounting
problem of unemployment and labor unrest (Garon (1988), p.173). The Lower Diet passed the
union bill in 1931 after overcoming substantial opposition, and the union movement surged in
the anticipation of the passage of the bill. In the Upper Diet, however, the bill was stalled
indeﬁnitely by a coalition of leading industrialists and conservative peers.60
In contrast to the U.S. outcome, Japanese business narrowly blocked union legislation during
the depression. As leading Japanese employers kept their reputation of benevolent management
better than their American counterparts, they were able to draw on the goodwill of their em-
ployees. Organized labor in Japan, by contrast, was deemed “radical” by the public and failed
to gain wide support from workers, especially in large establishments. Importantly, the defeat
of the union bill in 1931 was not caused by military intervention. Political power eﬀectively fell
into the hands of the military in the following year; but even then, government policies toward
unions changed little between 1932 and 1937 and union membership continued to increase until
1936. Major establishments adopting corporate welfarism, however, remained nonunion. Even
before the government repression of trade unions starting in 1937, the number of workers covered
by ERPs or similar employee organizations far exceeded union membership in Japan.61
In 1932, government oﬃcials began drafting an unemployment insurance bill, which business
leaders opposed, asserting that in the presence of corporate retirement allowance practices there
wasn oneed for state intervention (Saguchi (1977), pp.222-3). During the prolonged legislative
process, the unemployment insurance bill was transformed into the Retirement Allowance Fund
60NRUS (1959), VI-1; Garon (1988), pp.177-184; R¯ od¯ osh¯ o (1961), pp.439-58.
61Gordon (1985), pp.251-3; Taira (1970), p.146; Garon (1988), pp.157-70.
32Law of 1936, which obligated every ﬁrm with 50 or more employees to set up a retirement
allowance fund for each employee. Notably, aﬃrming prevailing corporate practices, the law
established the minimum amount of the retirement allowance contingent on an employee’s length
of service and the reason for separation (R¯ od¯ osh¯ o (1961), pp.310–23). Employers further won
a provision that allowed ﬁrms with retirement funds of “suﬃcient scope” to continue operating
their original plans with little modiﬁcation (NRUS (1964), pp.280-328). Gordon (1987) calls
the law “an ingenious variant of unemployment compensation” as it did not simply rely on
managerial benevolence, but explicitly linked a worker’s entitlement to unemployment beneﬁts
to “the quality of his service to a particular employer” (pp.268-9). Thus, in contrast to the
Social Security Act in the U.S., unemployment insurance in Japan legitimized and incorporated
corporate welfarism, while leaving substantial discretion to employers. By the late 1930s, regular
blue-collar workers in large establishments saw corporate beneﬁts as part of their compensation,
while business leaders described the provision of employment security and non-wage beneﬁts to
these employees as their moral and social responsibility (Morita (1958), pp.417-8).
In summary, the Japanese government continued to support corporate welfarism and ERPs
with the expectation that they would bring about industrial peace, social stability, and high
productivity. Consequently, labor laws in the U.S. and Japan evolved in diﬀerent directions
during the 1930s, reinforcing the diverging institutional paths.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper documents parallel institutional trajectories in the U.S. and Japan in the 1920s and
the process of bifurcation triggered by the Great Depression. By the early 1940s, employment
relations pertaining to blue-collar workers in the two countries began to diverge towards two
distinct equilibria. It took, however, two more decades for the establishment of modern industrial
relations systems (Moriguchi (2000)). Labor regulations during WWII propelled the bifurcation
process, as the respective governments tended to design their measures based on prevailing
corporate practices, as well as the selective compliance by employers and workers undermined
the regulations that were incompatible with prevailing practices. Despite a deep recession and
labor law reforms during the U.S. Occupation (1945-52), Japan continued down the same path
due largely to accumulated institutional capital. By 1960, explicit and elaborate employment
33contracts based on industrial unions and third-party enforcement were institutionalized in large
U.S. industrial ﬁrms, while implicit and discretionary contracts based on enterprise unions and
internal enforcement mechanisms emerged in their Japanese counterparts.
The comparative analysis indicates the following counterfactual for the U.S. Had the economy
begun to recover by 1931, American welfare capitalists could have maintained most of their
implicit promises during the depression. If the public support for private welfarism as a result
had been stronger, Congress might not have been able to pass the sweeping ban on unfair labor
practices included in the Wagner Act. And if so, a much larger fraction of ERPs in the U.S.
might have won against trade unions and have supported corporate welfare practices. In other
words, the Great Depression was not only suﬃcient but most likely necessary to induce the
decline of corporate welfarism characterized by implicit and discretionary contracts. Thus, I
argue that the replacement of American private welfare capitalism by trade unionism and state
welfarism was not inevitable, but rather the outcome of a delicate historical contingency.
The paper hence highlights the dynamic process of equilibrium selection and path-dependence
of the U.S. institutional trajectory. There were, however, important diﬀerences between the two
countries prior to the depression that were counter to the premise of the natural experiment.
I consider three alternative hypotheses to the historical contingency thesis developed in this
paper. First, cultural determinism argues that the individualism and cultural heterogeneity
in the U.S. were suﬃcient in precluding implicit contractual relations. Second, technological
determinism argues that the scientiﬁc management and mass production technology developed
in the U.S. resulted in the rise of explicit contracts. Third, political determinism argues that
the imperial government in Japan suppressed organized labor more so than the democratic gov-
ernment in the U.S., ensuring the dominance of ERPs over trade unions. Although each of
the three factors clearly played an important role, I argue that none of them alone would have
dictated the observed outcomes. Historical evidence indicates the transformation of workplace
culture (e.g., work ethics, loyalty, trust) in the respective countries in response to economic in-
centives and institutional environment, which was not necessarily predetermined by the national
culture (Gordon (1985)). The technological determinism overemphasizes the link between Tay-
lorism and workplace contractualism: during the 1920s, American management often regarded
scientiﬁc management and corporate welfarism as complementary practices to attain higher
34productivity (Nelson & Campbell (1972)), and postwar Japanese establishments combined both
methods in developing a system of ﬂexible mass production (Tsutsui (1998)).
Regarding political determinism, it is important to note that even in democratic America, the
passage of the Wagner Act was by no means guaranteed but depended on historical conditions.
To assess the role of the Japanese government, I propose the following thought experiment.
Suppose that the depression in Japan were as severe as in the U.S. With a much higher fraction
of employers abandoning their corporate welfare practices, business might have lost credibility
and failed to block the 1931 union law, which, in turn, might have stimulated labor movement in
large Japanese establishments. It is correct to argue that the right-wing government would have
eventually crashed unions regardless of the passage of the union law. However, had Japanese
trade unions taken stronger roots in the prewar period, the outcome of the postwar union
movement under a democratic regime might have turned out diﬀerently. That is, in the ﬁercely
contested representation elections in the late 1940s, industrial unions might have won over ERPs
in major companies, promoting explicit-contractual relations. As powerful as it was, the military
intervention might have not been suﬃcient to ensure the the prevalence of corporate welfarism
in Japan.
Finally, the paper documents that the institutional change induced by the Great Depres-
sion in the U.S. became less “reversible” as it was accompanied by the endogenous formation
of complementary institutions, such as collective bargaining organizations, legal enforcement
agency, and state social welfare programs. The paper thus identiﬁes a mechanism in which a
temporary economic shock could generate a lasting impact on long-run institutional develop-
ment. By combining a game-theoretic framework and an empirical historical investigation, the
paper contributes to better understanding the dynamics of institutional change.
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41Figure 1. Annual Turnover Rates in Manufacturing Establishments 
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U.S. Source: (I) 1910-18: Brissenden and Frankel (1920), Monthly  Labor Review 10, pp.1342-62;
(II) 1919-29: Berridge (1929), Monthly Labor Review 29, pp.64-5; (III) 1930-70: U.S. Department
of Labor, Employment, Hours, and Earnings.
1) Labor turnover is the sum of voluntary quits, layoffs, and discharges.
2) An annual turnover rate is the annual average of monthly turnover rates; a monthly turnover rate
is the number of workers separated from a given establishment within a month divided by the average
size of work force during that month.
3) In (I), turnover rates per 10,000 labor hours were reported.  Annual turnover rates were computed
assuming that one worker worked 30,000 labor hours per year.  The survey covered manufacturing
and non-manufacturing (public utilities and mercantile) establishments.
4) In (II), the unweighted median of the turnover rates for all sample firms was reported each year.
The survey covered 350 manufacturing establishments employing 700,000 workers in 1929.
5) In (III), the weighted average of the turnover rates for all firms in the sample was reported each
year.  The survey covered 38,000 manufacturing establishments employing 104,000,000 workers in
1970.
6) Before 1943, the data were production workers only; after 1943, the data covered all employees.
Japanese Source: (I) 1923-36: Nihon Rodo Undo Shiryo (1959), II-60; (II) 1937-40: IOSR (1965),
Taiheiyo Sensoka no Rodo Jotai (The Condition of Workers during the Pacific War), p.41; (III)
1948-75: Japanese Ministry of Labor, Monthly Labor Survey.
1) No turnover data are available before 1923 and between 1941-47.
2) In (I), the survey covered factory workers (kojo  rodosha) in  manufacturing  establishments
employing 50 or more regular production workers (joyo shokko).
3) In (III), the survey covered regular employees in manufacturing establishments with 5 or more
regular employees.    Regular employees were defined as the employees (a) whose contractual
durations were longer than one month or (b) who were employed for a period shorter than one
month but had been employed during previous two months for 18 days or more in each month.Figure 2.  Industrial Production and Manufacturing Employment 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1975), Historical Statistics of the United States, Series D-
130.  Bank of Japan (1966), Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy, p.397.
Showa Dojinkai (1973), Wagakuni Chingin Kozo no Shiteki Kosatsu (Historical Reflections on the
Japanese Wage Structure), Statistical Appendix.Table 1. Corporate Personnel Programs in the U.S., 1928







Retirement Pension Plan 121 (4.8%) 474 (28%) 685
Group Life Insurance Plan 1,600 (36%) 774 (47%) 2,374
Stock Ownership Plan 163 (3.7%) 287 (17%) 450
Profit Sharing Plan 168 (3.8%) 80 (4.8%) 248
Saving Plan 168 (3.8%) 328 (20%) 496
Housing Plan 264 (6.0%) 386 (23%) 650
Length-of-Service Bonus 384 (8.7%) 183 (11%) 567
Paid Vacation Plan 926 (21%) 427 (25%) 1,353
Plant Medical Service 1,556 (35%) 1,027 (61%) 2,583
B. Human Capital Investment
Apprenticeship Training 683 (16%) 499 (30%) 1,182
Training Unskilled or Semi-skilled 472 (11%) 330 (20%) 802
Foreman Training 216 (4.9%) 322 (19%) 538
General Education 35 (0.8%) 119 (7.1%) 154
Internal Promotion 176 (4.0%) 401 (24%) 577
C. Internal Enforcement Mechanisms
Picnics or Outings 666 (15%) 657 (39%) 1,323
Athletic Teams 454 (10%) 717 (43%) 1,171
Employee Club 106 (2.4%) 288 (17%) 394
Employee Magazine 97 (2.2%) 303 (18%) 400
Centralized Employment 273 (6.2%) 701 (42%) 974
Centralized Discharge 194 (4.4%) 401 (24%) 595
Personnel Department 110 (2.5%) 575 (34%) 685
Suggestion System 212 (4.8%) 389 (23%) 601
Safety Committee 1,270 (29%) 1,126 (67%) 2,396
Group Meetings 300 (6.8%) 251 (15%) 551
Mutual Benefit Association 198 (4.5%) 498 (30%) 696
Employee Representation Plan 110 (2.5%) 146 (8.7%) 256
Source: NICB (1929), Industrial Relations Programs in Small Plants, Chapter II.
1) The number of plants adopting each welfare program is shown.  All the programs were for blue-
collar workers and were not required by law.
2) The survey covered 4,409 “small plants” employing 250 workers or less and 1,676 “large
plants” employing more than 250 workers.
3) Saving plans included saving & loan funds, saving & investment funds, building & loan funds.
4) Housing plans included company housing programs and home ownership plans.













1919 145 196 403,765 4,125,200 9.8%
1922 385 725 690,000 4,027,400 17.1%
1924 421 814 1,240,704 3,536,100 35.1%
1926 432 913 1,369,078 3,502,400 39.1%
1928 399 869 1,547,766 3,479,800 44.5%
1932 313 767 1,263,194 3,144,300 40.2%
1934 N.A. 1,075* 1,769,921 3,069,000 57.7%
1935 N.A. 1,577* 2,597,600 3,753,300 69.2%
1941 N.A. 598 411,000 8,698,000 4.7%
1947 N.A. 222 469,000 14,595,000 3.2%
Source: NICB (1925), The Growth of Works Councils in the United Sates, p.10.
NICB (1933), Collective Bargaining Through Employee Representation, p.16.
NICB (1933) Individual and Collective Bargaining under the NIRA, p.16.  
NICB (1934), Individual and Collective Bargaining in May, 1934, p.12.
NICB (1936), What Employers Are Doing for Employees, p.10.
Jacoby (2000), “A Road Not Taken: Independent Local Unions in the U.S. since 1935,”  p.82, in
Nonunion Employee Representation, edited by Kaufman & Taras.  
Troy (1965), Trade Union Membership, 1897-1962, p.1.
1) A large company with multiple plants or establishments typically had more than one ERP.
2) The numbers with * were estimated assuming that the average number of employees per ERP
remained constant (1,647) between 1932-35.Table 3. The Cost of Personnel Programs in the U.S.
Cost as % of Total Annual Payroll













sample size 90 1 200 400 70
Pension 0.33 N.A. 0.50 0.80 N.A. 0.61
a 0.71
Group life Insurance 0.60 0.75 0.73 0.80 1.30 0.73
Disability benefit N.A. N.A. 0.20 0.30 0.78 0.46
b 0.34
Profit sharing N.A. N.A. 2.70 4.40 4.30 3.80
Supplemental bonuses N.A. N.A. 1.80 2.90 N.A. 2.35
Housing program 1.00 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1.00
Paid vacations N.A. N.A. 1.50 0.90 N.A. 1.50
c 1.30
Medical services 0.32 N.A. 0.43 0.30 0.34 0.35
Dining services 0.31 N.A. 0.55 0.60 N.A. 0.49
Recreational services 0.26 N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.22 0.24
Training& education 0.15 0.17 N.A. N.A. 0.10 0.14
Employee magazine 0.21 0.10 N.A. N.A. 0.10 0.14
Health & safety 0.13 0.50 0.43 N.A. N.A. 0.35
Employment procedure 0.31 N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.34 0.33
Total (all 14 plans) 12.26%
Total (12 basic plans) 6.11%
Source: AMA (1925), Cost Finding for Personnel Activities.
NICB (1925), Employee Magazines in the United States.
NICB (1928) The Economic Status of the Wage Earners in New York and Other States. 
NICB (1929), Industrial Relations Programs in Small Plants.
NICB (1934), Effect of the Depression on Industrial Relations Programs.
a. Epstein (1926), The Problem of Old Age Pension in Industry, with the sample size 100.
b. BLS (1928), Bulletin No. 458, with the sample size 80.
c. BLS (1927), Vacation with Pay for Industrial Workers, with the sample size 90.
Note:
1) The costs of the respective welfare programs are expressed as % of total annual factory payroll.
All numbers are estimated by the author; details are available upon request.
2) All the costs are employers’ expenses net of employee contributions.
3) Supplemental bonuses included length-of-service bonus, attendance bonus, and quality of
product bonus.
4) The second last row reports total cost of all the 14 plans in the table.
5) The last row reports total cost of 12 “basic plans”  excluding profit sharing plans and
supplemental bonus plans.Table 4. Corporate Personnel Programs in Japan, 1921 and 1932
Establishments with Programs





Retirement Allowance or Pension 73 (47%) 967 (42%)
Group Insurance Plan 36 (23%) N.A.
Non-work Injury & Sickness Benefits 107 (68%) 515 (22%)
Injury, Sickness & Death Benefits for Family 79 (50%) 227 (9.8%)
Stock Ownership Plan N.A. 63 (2.7%)
Profit Sharing Plan 272 (12%)
End-of-term Bonus 126 (80%) N.A.
Length-of-Service Bonus 55 (35%) 102 (4.4%)
Savings Plan 84 (54%) N.A.
Loans to Employees 33 (21%) 276 (12%)
Company Housing 101 (64%) 796 (35%)
Housing Allowance 20 (13%) 134 (5.8%)
Discount Purchase 91 (58%) 777 (34%)
Plant Medical Care 149 (95%) 1,109 (48%)
B. Human Capital Investment
Supplementary Education 34 (22%) 480 (21%)
Corporate Training Program 28 (18%) 249 (11%)
Company Library 48 (31%) 811 (35%)
C. Internal Enforcement Mechanisms
Picnics or Field Days 97 (62%) 863 (37%)
Social Gatherings 90 (57%) 1,187 (51%)
Athletic Facilities 60 (38%) 1,529 (66%)
Employee Magazine 48 (31%) 287 (12%)
Employee Associations 68 (43%) 919 (40%)
Suggestion System 14 (8.9%) N.A.
Safety Committee N.A. 1,385 (60%)
Mutual Aid Association N.A. 271 (12%)
Joint Administration N.A. 211 (9.1%)
Source: Kyochokai (1924), Hompo Sangyo Fukuri Shisetsu Gaiyo (An Overview of  Industrial
Welfare Facilities in Japan); Shakaikyoku (1933, 1934), Kojo Kozan  no  Fukuri  Shisetsu Chosa (A
Survey on Welfare Facilities in Industrial Establishments), I-III.
1) The 1921 sample consists of 157 large private establishments employing 300 or more employees;
the 1932 sample consists of 2,310 private establishments employing 100 or more employees.
2) All the programs were for blue-collar workers and were not required by law.
3) “End-of-term bonuses (kimatsu shoyo)” were bonuses given monthly or semiannual; some of
them were profit sharing plans.
4) “Employee associations” include ERP, mutual aid associations (kyosai kumiai), employee clubs,
and other employee organizations.
5) “Joint administration” includes employee participation in welfare administration  through ERP,
mutual aid associations, or other employee organizations.Table 5. Retirement Allowance Plans in Large Establishments in Japan, 1932
Amount of Allowance Stipulated
(days of wages)
Length of Service A. Retirement due to
personal reasons




Less than 1 year 0-10 0-14 2.0
1-3 7-35 14-38 5.0
3-5 37-61 44-72 9.0
5-7 63-88 81-115 22.5
7-10 97-162 128-192 30.5
10-15 147-286 193-346 53.0
15-20 281-446 358-520 75.5
20-25 415-575 528-700 119.0
Source: Zensanren (1932a), Wagakuni ni okeru Romusha Taishokuteate Seido no Genjo (The
Conditions of Retirement Allowance Plans in Japan), pp.22-3; Zensanren (1932b), Wagakuni ni
okeru Kaikoteate Seido no Genjo (The Conditions of Dismissal Allowance Plans in Japan), pp.22-3.
1) Using the same sample of 165 large establishments (employing 200 or more workers), the two
surveys reported 145 retirement allowance plans and 142 augmented retirement allowance plans for
production workers, respectively.
2) The ranges of the amount of allowances stipulated in the representative plans are shown.
3) The numbers in B are net of advanced-notice allowance (14 days of wages) mandated by the 1926
Revised Factory Law.




















1929 45,123 32,536 72.1% 66.2 1.59 41.6
1930 59,873 42,974 71.8% 176.2 1.55 113.6
1931 58,496 35,348 60.4% 268.7 1.47 182.8
1932 39,073 19,742 50.5% 172.0 1.43 120.7
1933 29,396 13,297 45.2% 97.6 1.39 70.3
Source: Shakaikyoku, Kojo  Rodosha Kaiko Teate Chosa (Factory Workers Dismissal Allowance
Survey), 1929-1933.
1) The survey covered 5,000 to 5,600 private factories employing 50 or more regular workers.
2) The reported allowances in C include the advanced-notice allowance (14 days of wages) mandated
by the Revised Factory Law in 1926.  
3) The wages were the average basic daily wages (teigaku chingin) of male blue-collar workers in
private factories employing 50 or more regular workers reported in NRUS (1959).